Status: what is and is not there
Souspli is an experimental alpha. This page is the plain list, kept next to the user guide on purpose: nothing here should surprise you after you have installed it.
Solid
Built, and covered by the automated suites (about 270 end-to-end tests against the real app, about 190 unit tests, 41 cross-implementation conformance vectors, on macOS, Windows and Linux):
- The sealed container: 49 escape attempts — network by every route, storage, navigation, window-opening, permissions, overlaying the trusted header — all blocked, verified from outside the renderer by a listener that must stay silent.
- The format: canonical encoding, hashing, signing, sealing, and the admission gate that refuses anything not fully verified.
- Writing, publishing, versioning, copying and exporting letters; the fifteen built-in types; drafts with attachments.
- Comments and threads, attestations, co-signed documents, votes.
- Groups and forums: rosters, join requests, tribe-weighted ranking, folding of moderated posts.
- Petnames, vouches, and the depth-two tribe.
- Transports: file, paste, double-click,
bundle:by hash, BitTorrent magnets with resumable background transfers, and Nostr relays with on-demand offers.
Not there yet
| Missing | What it means for you |
|---|---|
| Writing sealed (private) letters | The format supports encrypted letters and Souspli can open them, but there is no way to write one from the app. Everything you publish is readable by whoever gets the file. |
| A moderator's button | Moderation verdicts (hide / endorse) are verified, honoured and displayed, but the app has no control for a moderator to issue one. |
| Verified names (ENS) | The logic is written and tested, but the library it needs is not shipped and there is no setting for an Ethereum node. In current builds no name is ever shown as verified; you have petnames. |
| Key rotation and revocation | A stolen key signs as you forever. No mechanism yet. |
| Recovery phrase for an existing key | A phrase is shown only when an identity is generated. Afterwards the only backup is the raw private key. |
| Hardware wallets, OS-backed signing | Keys are held in software. |
| Other signature schemes for writing | Letters are signed with an Ethereum-style key only. Nostr-key signatures verify on receipt; the SSH scheme in the specification is not implemented. |
| Signed installers, auto-update | Your OS will warn on first launch, and you update by hand. |
| Somewhere to start | The relay list is empty and no community is suggested. A new install is an empty room until someone hands you a letter or a relay address. |
| Opening enclosed PDFs and documents | They travel intact and can be exported, but the container cannot display them. |
| Mobile, or a web viewer | Desktop only. |
Likely to change
- The specification is a draft; nothing in it is stable, and it ends with its own list of known gaps.
- The relay event kind and tag names are provisional.
- Fetching letters from
https://links is a development convenience and is expected to be removed before a first stable release. - An independent security review of the format and the container has not happened yet. Until it has, treat every guarantee on these pages as tested by its authors.
So what should I use it for?
Trying the idea. Reading and writing things you would be content to see public. Running a small forum among people who know each other. Telling us where it breaks.
Not yet: anything confidential, anything valuable, or anything you need to still be able to open in five years without keeping your own backups.
What comes next is on the roadmap.